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Implementation of Elliptic
Curve25519 in Cryptography
Intan Muchtadi-Alamsyah and Yanuar Bhakti Wira Tama
Abstract
Bernstein’s design implementation of elliptic Curve25519 in key exchange is
claimed to be highly secure and efficient. This curve is, for example, used in the key
exchange scheme of TextSecure for Instant Messaging. In this paper, we present an
implementation of elliptic Curve25519 in the simplified Elliptic Curve Integrated
Encryption Scheme, thus showing that elliptic Curve25519 can also serve other
purposes than key exchange. The curve is in Montgomery form, which makes it
possible to use Montgomery ladder. Point compression, point decompression,
encryption, and decryption algorithms are presented for the simplified Elliptic
Curve Integrated Encryption Scheme.
Keywords: elliptic curve, cryptography, Montgomery ladder, integrated
encryption scheme
1. Introduction
Curve25519 is an elliptic curve in Montgomery form with base field Fp and
p = 2255–19. In [1], Bernstein explains its design implementation, which is claimed to
be highly secure and efficient. It is, for example, used in the key exchange scheme
of TextSecure for Instant Messaging [2]. The advantage of using this curve is that
for some point operations, we can use only the x-coordinate, which simplifies the
computations and also saves storage.
In previous papers we have presented implementations of elliptic curves in
Weierstrass form in a binary field: the implementation of a binary field arithmetic
operation algorithm [3, 4] and the implementation of the simplified Elliptic Curve
Integrated Encryption Scheme (S-ECIES) in a binary field [5]. In the current paper,
we present the implementation of Curve25519 in S-ECIES, thus showing that
Curve25519 can also serve other purposes than key exchange.
2. Elliptic curve Montgomery form
Before defining Curve25519, we will give some basic theory on elliptic curves. This
paper is only concerned with elliptic curves in Montgomery form, not Weierstrass
form. An elliptic curve over Fp in Montgomery form is defined by the equation.
By2 ¼ x3 þ Ax2 þ x, (1)
where A(B2  4) 6¼ 0.
1
On the points of the elliptic curve, we may define point addition, negation,
and doubling. We define point negation as follows: let E be an elliptic curve over
Fp and point P(x,y) be a point on E. We define point negation of P as –P(x, y).
Let P(x1,y1) and Q(x2,y2) be two distinct points on E. Then the point addition is P+Q
(x3 ,y3), where
x3 ¼ λ
2  A x1  x2
 
, y3 ¼ λ x1  x3ð Þ  y1 and λ ¼ y2  y1
 
= x2  x1ð Þ. If
P = Q, then the doubling point P + P is 2P(x4,y4), where
x4 ¼ λ
2  A 2x1
 
, y4 ¼ λ x1  x4ð Þ  y1 (2)
and λ ¼ 3x1
2 þ 2Ax1 þ 1
 
= 2By1
 
.
The points on the elliptic curve along with point at infinity O form a commuta-
tive group with point addition as its operation.
We define scalar point multiplication as follows: given a positive integer m,
scalar point mP is defined by mP = P+P+...+P (m times addition of P).
The advantage of using Montgomery form rather than Weierstrass form is that
in Montgomery form, it is possible to operate without y-coordinates.
Elliptic curve operation in Montgomery form without y-coordinates can be done
as follows [6]: let (X:Y:Z) be the projective representation of point P(x,y) in E,
define nP = (Xn:Yn:Zn), and write (x,y) as (X/Z,Y/Z). It is clear that (m+n)P = mP
+nP. If Pm(x1,y1) = mP and Pn(x2,y2) = nP, x1 = Xm/Zm and x2 = Xn/Zn, then point
addition is Pm+Pn (x3,y3) = (m+n)P, where x3 = Xm+n/Zm+n and
Xmþn ¼ Xm  Zmð Þ Xn þ Znð Þ þ Xm þ Zmð Þ Xn  Znð Þ½ 
2 (3)
Zmþn ¼ Xm  Zmð Þ Xn þ Znð Þ  Xm þ Zmð Þ Xn  Znð Þ½ 
2 (4)
Point doubling is 2Pn(x4,y4) = 2nP = P2n, where x4 = X2n/Z2n and
X2n ¼ Xn þ Znð Þ
2 Xn  Znð Þ
2 (5)
Z2n ¼ 4XnZnð Þ Xn þ Znð Þ
2 þ A 2ð Þ=4 ∗ 4XnZnð Þ
h i
, 4XnZn ¼ Xn þ Znð Þ
2  Xn  Znð Þ
2 (6)
Based on the work by Okeya and Sakurai reported in [7], we can recover the y-
coordinate in projective coordinates. Let P(x,y), P1(x1,y1), P2(x2,y2) be points on a
Montgomery-form elliptic curve. Express P1 = (X1/Z1,Y1/Z1), P2 = (X2/Z2, Y2/Z2),
and define X1
rec, X2
rec, X3
rec as follows:
X1
rec ¼ 2ByZ1Z2X1 (7)
Y1
rec ¼ Z2 X1 þ xZ1 þ 2AZ1ð Þ X1xþ Z1ð Þ  2AZ1
2
 
 X1  xZ1ð Þ
2X2 (8)
Z1
rec ¼ 2ByZ1Z2Z1 (9)
Assuming P2 = P1+P, then in projective coordinates the relation
X1
rec
: Y1
rec
: Z1
recð Þ ¼ X1 : Y1 : Z1ð Þ holds.
3. Curve25519 and simplified ECIES
Curve25519 is the elliptic curve of Montgomery form
y2 ¼ x2 þ 486662 x2 þ x (10)
on Fp2, where p is the prime number 2
255-19. Based on Bernstein’s paper [1],
there are two subgroups of Curve25519 with large-size order, i.e., {O} ∪ {E
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(Fp2) ∩ (FpFp)} with size order 8  (2252 + 277423177773723535358 51937790
883648493) and {O} ∪ {E(Fp2) ∩ (Fp √2Fp)} with size order 4  (2253–55484
63555474470 7071703875581767296995).
S-ECIES is based on the elliptic curve discrete logarithm problem described as
follows [8]: let p be a prime number larger than 3. Let E be an elliptic curve over Fp
such that E contains a cyclic subgroup H, generated by P, of prime order m. The
plaintext space is Fp* and the ciphertext space is (Fp  F2)  Fp*. The key space is
L = {(E, P, Q, n, m): Q = nP}. Curve E and points P, Q, and m become public keys,
and n becomes the private key.
For every a ∈ Fp* and a secret number k ∈ [1, n  1], the encryption function is
e a; kð Þ ¼ Point Compress kPð Þ; a:a0 mod pð Þ∈ Fp  F2
 
 Fp*, (11)
where a0 6¼ 0 is the absis of kQ.
For every (V, c) ∈ (Fp  F2)  Fp*, the decryption function is
d V; cð Þ ¼ c x0ð Þ
1, (12)
where (x0, y0) is the coordinate of Point-Decompress(V).
We know that the groups {O} ∪ {E(Fp2) ∩ (Fp  Fp)} and {O} ∪ {E
(Fp2) ∩ (Fp √2Fp)} are finite with group size at 8  p1 and 4  p2, respectively,
for some primes p1 and p2. Hence, E contains a subgroup with prime order; there-
fore, Curve25519 can be implemented in ECIES.
4. Implementation
In this section, we will give several algorithms in Curve25519 for implementation
in S-ECIES, i.e., Montgomery ladder, point compression, point decompression, and
others.
An advantage of using an elliptic curve in Montgomery form is that Montgom-
ery ladder can be used for scalar point multiplication.
Algorithm 1Montgomery Ladder.
INPUT: scalar n, point P
OUTPUT: nP
1.R0 O
2.R1 P
3.for i m down to 0
4. if di = 0
5. R1 R0+R1(Point Addition)
6. R0 2R0 (Point Doubling)
7.else
8. R0 R0+R1 (Point Addition)
9. R1 2R1 (Point Doubling)
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10.end if
11.end for
12.return(R0)
Now, we can talk about point compression and point decompression in
Curve25519. The algorithm for point compression is straightforward from the exis-
tence of two points with the same x-coordinate on an elliptic curve, but with a
different y-coordinate, i.e., point (x,y) and point (x,-y), which is equal to point
(x,p-y). Because p is odd prime, if y is an odd number, then p-y is an even number
and vice versa. Hence, we can compress point (x,y) by (x, ymod 2), of which the
possible result is (x,0) or (x,1).
Remember that in Curve25519 the y-coordinate is defined when y is not a qua-
dratic residue or (x,y√2). By the same argument, if (x,y√2) is on E, then (x-(p-y)
√2) is also on E. However, before we can compress a point with form (x,y√2), we
have to divide the y-coordinate with√2 to avoid problems in real computation.
Then, the possible result when we compress the point with form (x,y√2) is also
(x,0) or (x, 1).
Algorithm 2. Point Compression
INPUT: Point(x,y).
OUTPUT: Point(x,i)
1. if y quadratic residue modulo p then
2. i ymod 2
3.return (x,i)
4.else
5.y y/√2.
6. i ymod 2
7.return (x,i)
8.end if
The inverse algorithm for point compression is point decompression, i.e.,
recalling the “real” y-coordinate from point compression.
Algorithm 3. Point Decompression.
INPUT Point (x,i).
OUTPUT Point (x,y)
1.z x3+486662x2+x
2. if z quadratic residue modulo p then
3.y √z mod p
4. if y = i mod 2 then
5. return (x,y)
4
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6.else
7. return(x,p-y)
8.end
9.else
10.z z/2 mod p
11.y √zmod p
12. if y = imod 2 then
13. return (x,y√2)
14.else
15. return(x,(p-y)√2)
16.end
17.end
The next algorithms are used to recover the y-coordinate in elliptic curve
Montgomery form, because we need it in ECIES.
Now we can give the algorithms for encryption and decryption. For a point
generator P in Curve25519 that has a prime order n, if Alice sends message x to
Bob with private key m so Q = mP, then Alice encrypts the message with the
following algorithm:
Algorithm 4. Encryption in Simplified ECIES
INPUT: Plaintext a
OUPUT: Ciphertext (V(x1,y1),c)
1.k random([1,n-1])
2.R(x1,z1) (k-1)P
3.Q(x2,z2) R(x1,y1)+P
4.R(y1) Recovery-Y(P,R(x1,z1),Q(x2,z2))
5.U(x3,y3) R+P
6.V(x3,y3) Point-Compression(U(x3,y3))
7.V(x4,y4) kQ
8.y x0.a
9.return(V(x3,y3),y)
Note that in the above algorithm in line 4, there is the command “Recovery-Y.”
This command is based on Okeya and Sakurai [7].
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If Bob wants to read the actual message from Alice, then Bob decrypts Alice’s
message using the following algorithm:
Algorithm 5. Decryption in Simplified ECIES.
INPUT: Ciphertext(y1,y2)
OUTPUT: Plaintext a
1.(x0,y0) mPoint-Decompress(y1)
2.a x0
1
3.b y2a
4.return b
Since this elliptic curve contains a cyclic subgroup of prime order, it is possible
to apply S-ECIES. For example, fix base point P(X:Y:Z) with X = 9, Z = 1 (because
in Curve25519, z1 always has a value of 1), and the y-coordinate can be chosen
randomly between odd and even integers that satisfy y2 = x3 + 486662x2 + x.
The chosen base point P has prime point order, with point order m = 2252 + 2774231
777737235353585 937790883648493. Hence, the curve can be implemented in
S-ECIES.
Then, we choose a random integer, k, between 1 and m-1. Then, scalar multipli-
cation of k with point x = 9 by using the Montgomery ladder algorithm produces
kP(Xk::Zk), and by using a y-coordinate recovery algorithm we can get kP(Xk:Yk:Zk).
After that, we convert the projective coordinates to affine coordinates to get kP
(Xk/Zk,Yk/Zk), and we use Point-Compress(kP). Then the y-coordinate of ciphertext
is the multiplication of plaintext x with x3, where we get x3 from kQ = (x3,y3). Since
we only use the x-coordinate of kQ, we can use Montgomery ladder with scalar
k and point Q = nP.
For decryption, we first decompress V(x1,y1) and then use private key n to get
scalar multiplication nV, using only the Montgomery ladder algorithm. The last step
is multiplying the y-coordinate of ciphertext with the inverse of the x-coordinate of
nV to get the plaintext x. This inverse exists, because we are working in a prime
field and the x-coordinate of V is not zero.
Now, we discuss arithmetic in Fp with p = 2
255
–19. There are two operations in
Fp, addition and multiplication. However, in Fp with p = 2
255
–19, it is not that easy.
Bernstein [1] used radix 225.5, which is a polynomial with form
P
αixi with i is a
number between 0 and 9 and αi is a multiple of 2
[25.5i] (where [x] is the smallest
integer that is larger than x) and αi/2
[25.5i] is an integer between 225 and 225. With
the restriction that if i is an odd number then αi/2
[25.5i] is between 224 and 224,
while if i is an even number then αi/2
[25.5i] is between 225 and 225, therefore, every
element in Fp with p = 2
255
–19 can be converted in radix polynomial form. The
following algorithm converts integers to radix as follows:
Algorithm 6. Integers to radix 225.5
INPUT: n
OUTPUT: R(x)
1.d BINARY(n)
2.p LENGTH(d)
3.a 0
4.while p > 26 do
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5. if a = 0 mod 2 then
6. p p-26
7. ka 26
8.else
9. p p-25
10. ka 25
11.end
12.a a+1
13.end
14. sum ZEROS(1,a)
15.ka p-1
16.for i 1 to p do
17. if d(i)=1 then
18. sum(a) sum(a)+2ka
19.end
20.end
21.for i a-1 downto 0 do
22. l ki-1
23.for j p+1 to p+ki do
24. if d(j)=1 then
25. sum(i) sum(i)+2l
26. end
27. l l-1
28.end
29.p p+ki
30.end
31.g(x) (sum(0)+...+sum(a)xa)
32.Return g(x)
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From the above algorithm, first convert the integer to binary representation, and
then from the right partition every 26,25,26,25,...,k, with 0 ≤ k ≤ 25, as an example
of an integer with length of binary representation is 231, then partition from the
right 26,25,26,25,26,25,26,25,26,1. Every partition states the value sum of d(i)2i1,
with d(i) is the value of the order of the binary representation that is either 0 or 1.
Also, the j-th partition is the coefficient of xj1.
Example: Suppose we have a 15-digit number, 325606250916557, which has binary
representation “1001010000010001100 01110 01110 11000 01010 10110 01101.” For
integers, 325606250916557 has two partitions, i.e., 00111011000010101011001101 and
10010100000100011000111. Therefore, the coefficient of x0 is 0.225 + 0.224 + 1.223 +
... + 0.21 + 1.20, which if we calculated would be the value 15477453. In the same way,
coefficient x1 would be the value 4851911. Thus, the number 325606250916557
represented by radix 225.5 would be 4851911x + 15477453. Also, we can use.
addition and multiplication in radix 225.5.
After we have converted any integer, there is an additional problem when the
coefficient of radix 225.5 exceeds our definition. For this problem, Bernstein [1] has
already provided a solution.
5. Applications
Communication systems in the future are expected to interact between diverse
types of devices. This allows the user to construct a personal distributed environ-
ment using a combination of different communication technologies. The security of
transmitted data between these devices is a very important aspect.
Nowadays instant messaging is popular for personal and business communica-
tions instead of short messages (SMS) on mobile devices. However, most mobile
messaging applications do not protect confidentiality or message integrity. Super-
vision over private communications conducted by the NSA motivates many people
to use alternative messaging solutions for security and privacy of communication on
the Internet. A messaging app that claims to be secure instant messaging and has
attracted a lot of attention is TextSecure.
Elliptic curve cryptosystem (ECC) is a public-key cryptography suitable for use
in environments with limited resources such as mobile devices and smart cards. In
cryptography, Curve25519 is an elliptic curve that offers 128 security bits and is
designed for use in the Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman (ECDH) key agreement key
design scheme. This curve is one of the fastest ECC curves and more resistant to the
weak number random generator.
In the TextSecure application, Curve25519 is used for key exchanges and
authentication. However, in this paper we show that Curve25519 can also be
implemented in simplified Elliptic Curve Integrated Encryption Scheme (S-ECIES).
Therefore Curve25519 serves for key exchange, authentication, encryption, and
decryption. As Curve25519 is built in such a way as to avoid potential attacks on
implementation and avoid side channel attacks and random number generator
issues, one may expect more secure communication systems.
6. Conclusion
The curve being used in this paper is y2 = x3 + 48666x2 + x, a Montgomery curve,
over the prime field 2255–19. This protocol uses elliptic point compression (only the
X-abscissa), allowing for efficient use of Montgomery ladder for ECDH, which uses
only XZ coordinates.
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In this research we develop efficient algorithms for elliptic curve cryptography
using Curve25519 which is implemented in security of instant messaging.
Several algorithms have been established for the implementation of Curve25519
in simplified ECIES: Montgomery ladder for scalar point multiplication, point com-
pression and point decompression, encryption and decryption in simplified ECIES,
and the algorithm integer to radix for the arithmetic in Fp with p = 2
255
–19.
In a future research, implementation of Curve25519 in Elliptic Curve Digital
Signature Algorithm may be attempted.
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